Adrian Northrup

Following last Tuesday’s elections, Donald Rumsfeld resigned from his position as secretary of defense in President Bush’s cabinet. In a move that was long overdue, Rumsfeld stepped down after six tumultuous years of administrative mistakes and military blunders. Rumsfeld made several critical errors in the handling of both the war on terrorism and the Iraq conflict that the new Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the American people as a whole are going to have to deal with for years to come.

On the day before the Democratic Party’s retaking of power in both the U.S. House and Senate, only a few of the most hawkish of conservatives could have thought that Rumsfeld still deserved to have a job. His performance was littered with devastating miscalculations, and the fact that he still had his job as of Monday last week is really a commentary on the effectiveness and decision-making capabilities of the current Bush administration.

Rumsfeld’s handling of the Iraq invasion is the most evident of Rumsfeld’s failures. His underestimating of the amount of troops that would be necessary to maintain the peace after the invasion and his disastrous decision to disband the Iraqi army following the upheaval of Saddam Hussein were the two major causes for the deepening pool of violence that Iraq has been sinking into.

Along with his bungling of the Iraqi conflict, Rumsfeld’s policies have hindered the overall effectiveness of the U.S. war on terrorism. He and the rest of the Bush administration chose the path of war to combat terrorism, choosing to wage large-scale military operations against nations that could be connected to terrorism rather than the complicated, but arguably more effective, route using of diplomatic, intelligence and law enforcement tactics.

Also, Rumsfeld’s decision to go into Iraq fragmented the military, lessening its chances of success in what had been the original center of the war on terrorism, Afghanistan. By fighting several different battles all over the globe in Iraq, the Philippines and South Africa along with Afghanistan, Rumsfeld has spread the U.S. military precariously thin, causing it to struggle on all fronts rather than succeed convincingly in one.

The U.S. military also suffered a great deal of damage due to the policies of Rumsfeld, both structurally and functionally.

According to journalist Bob Woodward’s book “State of Denial,” Rumsfeld appointed officers in key positions in the military that were essentially yes-men to him. This eroded the amount of dichotomy and differing opinions concerning military action abroad, allowing Rumsfeld and his supporters in the military to essentially make decisions without any alternative opinions being voiced or heard. This type of groupthink lead to many of the misguided decisions Rumsfeld made during the Iraqi invasion, most notably the number of troops originally deployed to Iraq.

These failures that have occurred over Rumsfeld’s six years in office will have lasting effects on the United States, probably for several years after his resignation.

The first most obvious negative result of his time as secretary of defense is the situation in Iraq. His decision to limit the number of troops involved in the operation and to disband Iraq’s standing army following the invasion have lead to the chaos that we see today and will have to deal with for years to come.

Additionally, his decision to expand the war on terrorism to Iraq has greatly strained the U.S. military’s capacity, hindering our ability to fight al-Qaida and other foreign terrorist groups.

Rumsfeld’s mismanaging of the military’s inner workings has also lead to monogamy of critical thinking concerning military decisions, something his successor Gates, and potentially his successor, will have to struggle to correct.

What then does this all mean for the new Secretary of Defense Gates and most certainly the person who follows him?

Although there certainly is doubt that Gates will be allowed to make any sweeping changes while Rumsfeld’s close friend and ally Dick Cheney is still in power, what it should mean is this – there will have to be major overhauls in the way the war against terrorism is conducted, the way the military is conducting its business, and matters concerning the conflict in Iraq.

The first step will be to eliminate all of the appointed cronies of Rumsfeld in both the Pentagon and the military, allowing for some opposing views to those of the Bush administration to be cultivated.

The second step, though, is not as clear cut as the first. It concerns troop allocation in the war on terrorism. A complete pullout from Iraq now would be irresponsible. It would allow the insurgents to overrun the incapable Iraqi police force and stake claim to the country. There will also certainly not be a national draft to increase the troop count in Iraq, leaving one feasible option – there will need to be a large-scale pullout of American forces in places such as Germany, Japan and South Korea in order to relocate them in either Iraq or Afghanistan, the two current most active fronts in the war on terrorism. This will clearly be a strategic blow to the U.S. military, but such is the legacy of Rumsfeld – one of blown chances, miscalculations and regression of the U.S. military’s power and capability.